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Abstract 
Moral systems universally prohibit harming others for personal gain. However, we know little 
about how such principles guide moral behavior. Using a task that assesses the financial cost 
participants ascribe to harming others versus themselves, we probed the relationship between 
moral behavior and neural representations of profit and pain. Most participants displayed moral 
preferences, placing a higher cost on harming others than themselves. Moral preferences 
correlated with neural responses to profit, where participants with stronger moral preferences 
had lower dorsal striatal (DS) responses to profit gained from harming others.  Lateral prefrontal 
cortex (LPFC) encoded profits gained from harming others, but not self, and tracked the 
blameworthiness of harmful choices. Moral decisions also modulated functional connectivity 
between LPFC and the profit-sensitive region of DS. The findings suggest moral behavior in our 
task is linked to a neural devaluation of reward realized by a prefrontal modulation of striatal value 
representations.  
 
 
Despite the diversity of human moral values, there is a universal prohibition on harming others for 
personal gain1,2. Humans avoid harming others to a remarkable degree compared with other 
species3, and are even willing to incur significant personal costs to alleviate others’ suffering4,5. 
Why, and how, people forgo self-interest for the sake of others’ welfare remains an enduring 
puzzle. Recent work has implicated specific brain regions in moral decision making6–9 and probed 
how moral behavior relates to social cognitive processes such as empathy and mentalizing10–14. 
However, little is known about the neural computations supporting moral decisions to avoid 
harming others for personal gain, and whether individual differences in these computations 
predict variation in actual moral behavior. 
We measured moral preferences in a task where participants could trade personal profits 
against pain experienced by either themselves or an anonymous other person (Fig. 1a). Most 
people required more financial compensation to increase others’ pain compared with their 
own15,16. In other words, profiting from another’s pain had lower subjective value than profiting 
from one’s own pain. One possible explanation for this moral preference is that another’s pain is 
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more aversive than one’s own pain. Alternatively, profits gained from harming another may 
engender less pleasure than the very same profits gained from harming oneself17.  
Because the moral behavior we are interested in here reflects a tradeoff between profit 
and pain, these competing explanations are not easily resolved from behavioral observation alone. 
However using neuroimaging we can ask whether individual differences in moral preferences are 
better explained by differential neural representations of pain or profit, in the context of harming 
others versus oneself. Previous neuroimaging studies of moral decision making have attributed 
activity in several brain regions to a range of cognitive processes. Activity in insula, anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) and temporoparietal junction (TPJ) is linked to empathy and 
mentalizing7,8,10–14; activity in striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is linked with 
value computation8,12,13; and lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) activity is considered to reflect 
cognitive control6–9. However, decomposing the cognitive mechanisms supporting moral decisions 
is difficult without resorting to reverse inference. Here we address this challenge by independently 
manipulating the amounts of profit and pain resulting from participants’ decisions (Fig. 1b). This in 
turn allowed us to extract neural representations of profit and pain and ask whether the former 
was suppressed, or the latter boosted, as a function of the behavioral expression of a moral 
aversion to harming others for profit. We avoid reverse inference by asking whether, in line with 
moral behavior, any brain region shows a greater response to others’ pain compared to one’s own 
pain, or a weaker response to profits gained from harming others relative to profits gained from 
harming oneself. Our prediction, based on prior literature, was that moral decisions involving a 
tradeoff between pain and profit would engage regions either implicated in pain processing or 
value-based decision making respectively, with pain encoded in insula, ACC and TPJ18,19, and profit 
encoded in the striatum and vmPFC20,21.  
Higher-order goals represented in regions such as lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) are 
known to modulate value computations in striatum and vmPFC22. In particular, LPFC is implicated 
in orchestrating an influence of moral norms on behavior23–29. This region shows increased 
activation to the extent that people choose to comply with fairness norms24, reciprocate trust26 
and avoid harming others for personal gain8. Disrupting LPFC activity impairs the integration of 
moral blame assessments into punishment decisions28. However, notwithstanding these 
observations the precise computational role of LPFC in promoting norm compliance remains 
unanswered. One proposal is that LPFC regulates moral behavior by re-weighting the inputs to 
policy decisions30, for example by modulating the subjective value of harmful actions represented 
in striatum23,31. This view is grounded in evidence for major anatomical projections from LPFC to 
dorsal striatum (DS)32,33 as well as LPFC modulation of DS value signals during temporal 
discounting34. On the bases of these prior data, we hypothesized that value-sensitive areas of DS 
would show a reduced response to profits gained from harming others, relative to harming 
oneself, and that moral decisions would modulate functional connectivity between these same 
value processing regions and LPFC. 
We tested our hypotheses in an fMRI study (N=28) where participants played the role of 
“decider” who chose whether to profit by inflicting painful electric shocks on either themselves or 
an anonymous other “receiver” (Fig. 1a-b). Crucially, deciders faced identical choice sets when 
deciding to profit from harm to others vs. self, enabling us to ask how potential moral 
transgressions modulate neural value computations of profit and pain. To mitigate concerns about 
reciprocity and reputation, deciders were instructed their choices would be private with respect to 
the receivers and experimenters, and post-study questionnaires confirmed they believed this. In a 
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second behavioral study (N=49) involving a similar design we asked participants to provide blame 
judgments in addition to moral decisions (Supplementary Fig. 1). This enabled us to build a model 
linking blame judgments and moral decisions, which we used to test hypotheses about moral 
norm representation in LPFC.  
 
 
Figure 1. Moral decision task and behavioral results. (a) In the fMRI study, participants assigned 
to the role of “decider” (N=28) chose between a harmful option containing more money and 
shocks, and a helpful option containing less money and fewer shocks. On half the trials the shocks 
were for the decider (left) and on the other half the shocks were for the receiver (right). (b) 
Example trial set where each point represents a trial. Across trials we independently manipulated 
the difference in pain and difference in profit between the two options, which allowed us to 
separate neural signals related to pain and profit. (c) Harm aversion (κ) was greater for others than 
self (t(27)=-2.40, P=0.024). (d) Distribution of moral preferences (κother – κself) among deciders. Error 
bars depict s.e.m. *P<0.05. 
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Results 
 
Computational model of moral decisions 
In the moral decision task we modeled deciders’ choices by adapting a model we previously 
validated in four behavioral studies15,16. The model again explained the current data well, correctly 
predicting 87% of deciders’ choices (95% confidence interval [85%-88%]; mean pseudo-R2=0.692) 
and outperformed a range of alternative models (Supplementary Modeling Note). The model 
described the difference in subjective value between the harmful and helpful options as follows: 
 
Δ𝑉 =  (1 − 𝜅)Δ𝑚 −  𝜅Δ𝑠 
𝜅 =  {
𝜅𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓     if self trial     
𝜅𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟    if other trial
 
where ΔV is the difference in subjective value between the harmful and helpful options, and Δm 
and Δs are the objective differences in money and shocks between the harmful and helpful 
options, respectively. ΔV is based on a weighted average of these two quantities, where the 
relative weighting is determined by a harm aversion parameter κ. When κ=0, deciders will accept 
any number of shocks to gain profit. As κ approaches 1, deciders become maximally harm averse 
and will sacrifice increasing amounts of profit to avoid an additional shock. The setting of κ 
depends on who is receiving the shocks, where κself and κother capture the subjective cost of harm 
to self and others, respectively. Trial-by-trial subjective value differences were transformed into 
choice probabilities using a softmax function35. Consistent with previous findings20,21 BOLD 
responses at choice onset correlated with model estimates of the subjective value of the chosen 
relative to the unchosen option (relative chosen value; GLM1) in a network including vmPFC 
(PFWE<0.0001), mid-posterior cingulate (PFWE <0.0001), precuneus (PFWE<0.0001), and bilateral 
clusters encompassing amygdala, striatum and insula (PFWE<0.0001; all results whole brain 
familywise error (FWE) corrected at the cluster level after voxel-wise thresholding at p<0.001).; 
Supplementary Fig. 2a and Supplementary Table 1). Relative chosen value signal in these regions 
did not significantly differ between the self and other conditions. 
Previous studies using this task showed that most participants displayed moral preferences 
involving a greater harm aversion for others than for self15,16. We replicated this effect again in the 
current study (κother > κself, M=0.053, SD=0.116, t(27)=-2.40, p=0.024; Fig. 1c). This pattern of moral 
preferences was observed in 68% of participants (Fig. 1d). Analysis of raw choice data indicated 
that participants were more likely to choose the harmful option for themselves than for the 
receiver (difference score, M=5%, SD=12%; t(27)=2.18, p=0.038). Moral preferences (computed as 
the difference in harm aversion for self and others, i.e., κother - κself) resulted in participants paying, 
on average, an extra 17p per shock to prevent shocks to others relative to themselves.  
Responses in vmPFC reflected these moral preferences. We regressed participant-specific 
subjective values for the harmful option against BOLD responses at decision time, and extracted 
the parameter estimates from the value-sensitive vmPFC region identified above. In this region of 
vmPFC, BOLD responses were less correlated with the value of harming others than the value of 
harming oneself (t(27)=2.51, p=0.019; Supplementary Fig. 2b). Nevertheless, as seen previously 
there was wide individual variation in the degree of expression of moral preferences, which we 
exploited to probe the neural computations that guide moral decisions.  
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Neural representation of pain is uncorrelated with moral behavior 
Our first aim was to test whether moral behavior is explained by a greater neural sensitivity to 
anticipated pain for others relative to self, or a lesser neural sensitivity to profit gained from 
harming others relative to self. We tested these hypotheses in a GLM that identified regions 
responding parametrically at decision onset, irrespective of participants’ choices, to the objective 
amounts of profit and pain (Δm and Δs) that would result from choosing the harmful option, 
relative to the helpful option, in the self and other conditions (GLM2). 
For the pain analysis, we identified voxels where activity varied parametrically with Δs, 
irrespective of choice. Region-of-interest (ROI) analyses revealed neural responses to Δsself and 
Δsother in ACC and TPJ, respectively, but these were not correlated with individual differences in 
behavior (Supplementary Fig. 3). For completeness, we regressed individual differences in moral 
preferences onto the group-level maps of parametric responses to anticipated pain for others 
relative to self (Δsother > Δsself). In a whole brain analysis, we found no significant clusters in a whole 
brain analysis exceeding a significance level of p<0.05 FWE corrected or within any a priori ROIs 
(Supplementary Table 2). Thus, we did not find evidence supporting a relationship between 
individual differences in neural responses to anticipated pain and variation in moral behavior. 
Although this null association could reflect an absence of robust neural responses to anticipated 
pain, this is unlikely because there was a robust relationship between individual differences in κself 
and neural responses to Δsself in the insula (PFWE=0.011, whole brain FWE corrected at the cluster 
level after voxel-wise thresholding at p<0.001; Supplementary Table 3). 
Finally, we investigated a possible relationship between other-related pain signals in TPJ 
and ACC and choice-related value signals in vmPFC. To test this, we correlated vmPFC responses to 
the value of harming others (Supplementary Fig. 2b) with TPJ and ACC responses to Δsother 
(Supplementary Fig. 3b & 3e).The correlations were not significant (vmPFC-TPJ: robust correlation, 
r = -0.04, 95% CI=[-0.43 0.41]; vmPFC-ACC: robust correlation, r = -0.02, 95% CI=[-0.41 0.40]). 
 
 
Neural representation of profit predicts moral behavior 
To determine whether moral behavior relates to a differential neural sensitivity to profits 
gained from harming others vs. self, we recapitulated the previous analysis of pain, identifying 
voxels where activity varied parametrically with Δm, irrespective of choice. We then asked 
whether these profit-sensitive regions showed differential sensitivity to profit gained from 
harming others, relative to harming oneself (Δmself  > Δmother). This contrast revealed a strong 
effect in left LPFC (PFWE=0.027, whole brain FWE corrected at the cluster level after voxel-wise 
thresholding at p<0.001; Fig. 2a and Supplementary Table 4). To probe the nature of this effect 
we extracted mean signal from an independently defined ROI in LPFC separately for the self and 
other conditions. This revealed an insensitivity to profit gained from harming oneself 
(βΔm_self=0.007 + 0.02, t(27)=0.31, p=0.76; Fig. 2b) but a negative parametric response in LPFC to 
profit gained from harming others (βΔm_other=-0.10 + 0.02; t(27)=-4.97, p=0.00003). The LPFC 
response to ill-gotten gains did not significantly differ on trials where participants chose to harm 
vs. help others (t(27)=0.16, p=0.87). The differential response in LPFC to profits gained from 
harming others vs. self was more pronounced as a function of the strength of expressed moral 
preferences, with more moral participants showing a stronger differential response to profit from 
self- vs. other-harm in LPFC (robust correlation, r=0.53, 95% CI [0.14 0.74]; Fig. 2c).  
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We then asked whether there were additional regions expressing differential activity for 
profits gained from harming self vs. others that in turn correlated with moral preferences. We 
regressed individual differences in moral preferences onto the group level maps of the parametric 
response to profiting from harming others relative to self (Δmself > Δmother). In addition to the 
previously observed effect in LPFC, we observed a robust effect in bilateral DS extending into 
insula (PFWE<0.0001), superior temporal gyrus (PFWE=0.007), posterior cingulate (PFWE<0.0001), and 
posterior medial PFC (PFWE=0.0003; all results whole brain FWE corrected at the cluster level after 
voxel-wise thresholding at p<0.001; Fig. 2d and Supplementary Table 5). This network overlapped 
substantially with regions where activity correlated with relative chosen value (conjunction 
analysis, PFWE <0.0001, whole brain FWE corrected at the cluster level after voxel-wise 
thresholding at p<0.001; Supplementary Table 6). Furthermore, other-related profit signals in DS 
were significantly correlated with relative chosen value signals in vmPFC (robust correlation, 
r=0.40, 95% CI [0.02 0.77]).  
To further investigate the relationship between moral preferences and DS responses to 
profits, we examined parametric responses in DS (mean signal extracted from independently 
defined ROI) to the amount of profit gained from harming self and others separately. Moral 
participants (κother > κself) showed a positive parametric response in DS to the amount of profit 
gained from harming oneself (βΔm_self=0.05 + 0.02, t(17)=2.60, p=0.018), but not to profit gained 
from harming others (βΔm_other=0.004 + 0.03, t(17)=0.15, p=0.88), and reductions in the DS response 
to profits gained from harming others (relative to self) correlated positively with moral 
preferences (robust correlation, r=0.49, 95% CI [0.20 0.72]; Fig. 2e). This suggests moral behavior 
might arise via an attenuation of DS responses to profits gained from harming others. 
 
 
Figure 2. Moral transgressions modulate corticostriatal responses to profit. (a) At choice onset, 
left LPFC activity negatively correlated with the relative amount of profit gained from harming 
others, but not self (Δmself > Δmother; PFWE=0.027, whole brain FWE corrected at the cluster level 
after voxel-wise thresholding at p<0.001). Image displayed at p<0.005, uncorrected to show extent 
of activation. (b) Mean signal from an independently defined ROI in LPFC, separately extracted for 
the self and other conditions, was uncorrelated with Δmself (t(27)=0.31, p=0.76) but negatively 
correlated with Δmother (t(27)=-4.97, p=0.00003). (c) Differential LPFC response to profits gained 
from harming self vs. others positively correlated with individual differences in moral preferences 
(robust correlation, r=0.53, 95% CI [0.14 0.74]). (d) Image shows a second-level parametric map of 
moral preferences regressed against the contrast Δmself > Δmother. For participants showing 
stronger moral preferences, DS was less responsive to profits gained from harming others than 
profits gained from harming self (PFWE<0.0001, whole brain FWE corrected at the cluster level after 
voxel-wise thresholding at p<0.001). Image displayed at p<0.005, uncorrected to show extent of 
activation. (e) Parameter estimates for Δmother and Δmself were extracted from an independently 
defined ROI in DS. Reduced DS responses to profits gained from harming others (relative to self) 
were positively correlated with moral preferences (robust correlation, r=0.49, 95% CI [0.20 0.72]). 
Error bars depict s.e.m. **P<0.01; ***P<0.0001; n.s., nonsignificant. 
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Computation of moral value in LPFC 
During moral decision making LPFC responded more strongly on trials where participants could 
harm others for a low profit, relative to trials where harming resulted in a high profit. A similar 
pattern has been reported for blame judgments, where blame is higher for moral transgressions 
resulting in lower profits36. Thus, people may anticipate more blame for harmful decisions yielding 
lower profits, and this anticipated blame could be encoded by LPFC, in line with previous work 
showing LPFC responses to moral norm violations24–30. Directly testing this hypothesis required us 
to construct, for each participant, a trial-by-trial trajectory of anticipated blame and regress this 
against LPFC activity. Although participants in the fMRI study did not provide blame judgments, we 
hypothesized that within our study population blame could be predicted based on choice features 
(Δm, Δs) and individual preferences (κself, κother). This allowed us to infer blame judgments for the 
fMRI participants from a model of blame built using data from a separate group of participants 
who provided blame judgments in addition to moral decisions (Fig. 3a).  
 
The model described blame judgments as follows:  
 
𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Δ𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽2Δ𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3Δ𝑚𝑡𝜅𝑜 + 𝛽4Δ𝑚𝑡𝜅𝑠 + 𝛽5Δ𝑠𝑡𝜅𝑜 + 𝛽6Δ𝑠𝑡𝜅𝑠 + 𝛽7Δ𝑚𝑡𝜅𝑜𝜅𝑠 + 𝛽8Δ𝑠𝑡𝜅𝑜𝜅𝑠 
 
where blame on trial t is a linear function of choice features on trial t (Δmt, Δst), individual 
preferences (κs, κo), and their interactive combinations (see Supplementary Modeling Note for 
parameter estimates; mean R2=0.33). Blame was negatively correlated with profit (βΔm=-0.07, 95% 
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CI=[-0.10 -0.04]) and positively correlated with pain (βΔs=0.05, 95% CI=[0.01 0.09]). Individual 
preferences modulated the relationship between profit, pain and blame such that participants 
with stronger moral preferences showed more extreme judgments and a stronger influence of 
pain (relative to money) on blame (Fig. 3b-c).  
Next, we performed multiple regression on the BOLD signal extracted from an 
independently defined ROI in LPFC. Using the blame model described above we constructed a 
trajectory of anticipated blame for each fMRI participant and then tested whether LPFC signal 
correlated with anticipated blame estimates in a GLM that included anticipated blame, relative 
chosen value and total value, which were orthogonalised (GLM3). This analysis showed a positive 
correlation between LPFC activity and anticipated blame (t(27)=2.67, p=0.012). The relationship 
between LPFC activity and anticipated blame remained significant when controlling for the total 
amounts of money and shocks on each trial (GLM4; t(27)=2.84, p=0.008). If LPFC computes 
anticipated blame to guide decision making then this value should be choice-independent. 
Consistent with this, the relationship between LPFC and blame did not differ significantly on trials 
where participants harmed vs. helped (t(27)=-0.86, p=0.40).  
An alternative account of LPFC function in prosocial behavior is that this region serves a 
role akin to a “brake system” for inhibiting self-interested behavior, i.e., influencing policy 
selection once values are computed31,37. To rule out this account, we conducted several analyses, 
focusing on trials in the other condition. First, we examined participants’ response times. If 
choosing the helpful option involves an inhibition of self-interest, then helpful choices should be 
slower than harmful choices (RT-GLM1, Supplementary Table 7). In fact, RTs were faster for 
helpful relative to harmful choices (t(27)= -3.76, p=0.0008). RT data actually supported a blame 
computation account. If moral choices involve integrating moral value into overall subjective 
value, then people with stronger moral preferences should respond slower in the other condition 
(where moral values must be computed) relative to the self condition (which requires no such 
computation). We tested this by comparing RTs for other vs. self in a second GLM (RT-GLM2, 
Supplementary Table 7) and found slowing in the other relative to the self condition was indeed 
positively correlated with moral preferences (robust correlation, r=0.52, 95% CI [0.11 0.80]). 
Next, we tested whether LPFC activity differed for harm vs. help trials. If LPFC is involved in 
inhibiting self-interest, then LPFC activity should be higher on “successful inhibition” trials, i.e., 
trials where participants chose the helpful option. Because participants were more likely to choose 
the helpful option on trials where harming would result in more blame (t(27)=54.29, p=4 x 10-29), we 
controlled for blame as well as relative chosen value and total value (GLM5). We found no 
difference in LPFC activity between help trials and harm trials (t(27)=-0.96, p=0.35), while the effect 
of blame on LPFC activity remained significant (t(27)= 2.89, p=0.007; Fig. 3d). Finally, we tested 
whether LPFC responses on help trials depend on the value of the harmful option (GLM6). If LPFC 
is required for inhibiting self-interest, it should be more active on trials where helping was more 
difficult (i.e., when the value of the harmful option was high). In fact, LPFC was not more active on 
help trials when the value of the harmful option was high (help*Vharm interaction, t(27)= -1.67, p 
=0.11). Rather, LPFC was less active on trials where the value of the harmful option was high, 
regardless of whether participants harmed or helped (Vharm main effect, t(27)= -2.21, p =0.04; Fig. 
3d). Thus, our findings are not consistent with the notion that moral behavior involves an 
inhibition of self-interest implemented by LPFC or indeed anywhere else in the brain.  
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Figure 3. Blame computation in LPFC. (a) Behavioral study participants (N=49) completed a moral 
decision task and a moral blame task. These data were used to construct a model of blame, which 
we used to construct a unique blame trajectory for each participant in the fMRI study (N=28). We 
then regressed these blame estimates against activity in an independently defined ROI in LPFC. (b-
c) Model estimates of blame as a function of profit (Δm) and pain (Δs) for a participant with low (b) 
and high (c) moral preferences. Across all participants, blame was highest for choices inflicting high 
pain for low profit. (d) LPFC signal was positively correlated with blame (GLM5; t(27)= 2.89, 
p=0.007); did not significantly differ for helpful vs. harmful choices (GLM5; t(27)=-0.96, p=0.35); and 
was negatively correlated with the subjective value of the harmful option Vharm (GLM6; t(27)= -2.21, 
p =0.04). Error bars depict s.e.m. *P<0.05; **P<0.01; n.s., nonsignificant. 
 
 
 
Moral decisions modulate corticostriatal connectivity 
Moral preferences were associated with reduced striatal responses to profit from harming others, 
relative to self, while LPFC responses correlated with model estimates of blame. This suggests LPFC 
may modulate DS responses to profit in line with anticipated blame. This would predict that LPFC 
should show differential functional connectivity with DS during decisions to help others, compared 
with decisions to harm others and decisions to help oneself. Consequently, we implemented 
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psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses with LPFC as a seed region. The PPI models included 
regressors for the main effect of LPFC activity, the main effect of decision type, and their 
interaction. We examined two decision types in two separate PPI models: (i) helpful choices in the 
other condition relative to harmful choices in the other condition (help-other > harm-other), and 
(ii) helpful choices in the other condition relative to helpful choices in the self condition (help-
other > help-self). This analysis revealed differential functional connectivity between LPFC and DS 
during help-other choices, relative to harm-other choices and help-self choices (conjunction of 
contrasts (i) & (ii): PFWE=0.025, whole brain FWE corrected at the cluster level after voxel-wise 
thresholding at p<0.001; Fig. 4a, Supplementary Fig. 4a and Supplementary Table 8). This region 
overlapped with the cluster in DS identified above as showing differential responses to profits 
from harming self vs. others as a function of moral preferences (Fig. 4b). The results are consistent 
with a model whereby LPFC modulates DS responses to profit in line with moral considerations. 
Participants with stronger moral preferences showed a greater reduction in the DS 
response to profits gained from harming others relative to self. If translating moral norms into 
moral behavior involves changes in functional connectivity between LPFC and DS, then we should 
also see a relationship between moral preferences and reduced responses to profiting from 
others’ pain in the precise area of DS that was functionally connected with LPFC. To test this 
hypothesis we extracted for each participant the contrast estimate (Δmself  > Δmother) from the DS 
cluster identified in the PPI analysis, and regressed these estimates against participants’ moral 
preferences. This analysis revealed a positive correlation between moral preferences and 
reductions in the DS response to profiting from harming others relative to self (robust correlation, 
r=0.36, 95% CI [0.002 0.68]; Fig. 4c). That is, moral decisions modulated functional connectivity 
between LPFC and DS, and the extent to which the DS showed a reduced response to profiting 
from others’ pain relative to one’s own pain predicted moral preferences.  
We next tested whether corticostriatal connectivity was associated with choice-related 
striatal value signals. As an index of value sensitivity in DS, we extracted for each participant the 
mean signal from the voxels in DS that were sensitive to relative chosen value (t(27) = 3.28, p = 
0.003). As an index of corticostriatal connectivity during helpful moral choices, we extracted from 
this same region of DS the signal from the PPI contrast LPFC * [Help other]. Choice-related value 
signals in DS were negatively correlated with corticostriatal connectivity (robust correlation, r =-
0.51, 95% CI [-0.73 -0.14]; Supplementary Fig. 4b), suggesting a negative connectivity between 
LPFC and DS during moral decisions as a function of value sensitivity in DS. 
 
Figure 4. Corticostriatal connectivity during the exercise of moral choices. (a) Moral decisions 
modulated functional connectivity between seed region in LPFC (blue) and DS (red). Red cluster in 
DS (PFWE=0.025, whole brain FWE corrected at the cluster level after voxel-wise thresholding at 
p<0.001) depicts conjunction of PPI contrasts (LPFC seed * help other > harm other) and (LPFC 
seed * help other > help self). Image displayed at p<0.005, uncorrected to show extent of 
activation. (b) The area of DS showing differential functional connectivity with LPFC during moral 
decisions (red) overlapped considerably with the area of DS showing reduced responses to profits 
gained from harming others vs. self (green; overlap shown in yellow). Image displayed at p<0.005, 
uncorrected to show extent of activation. (c) Within the area of DS showing differential functional 
connectivity with LPFC during moral decisions (red cluster), reduced responses to profits gained 
from harming others (relative to self) predicted moral preferences (robust correlation, r=0.36, 95% 
CI [0.002 0.68]).  
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Discussion 
We offer an account of how a moral prohibition against harming others is translated into moral 
behavior. Replicating previous findings15,16, we show most people prefer to harm themselves over 
others for profit. This moral preference was associated with diminished neural responses in value-
sensitive regions to profit accrued from harming others. This observation suggests a neural 
explanation for why people are reluctant to seek profits from immoral actions15–17, and disapprove 
of individuals and organizations who accept money from morally tainted sources36,38,  in revealing 
that moral transgressions corrupt neural representations of value. 
  Our findings implicate LPFC in computing the moral value of actions so as to guide moral 
decision making. LPFC negatively encoded the magnitude of profits gained from harming others 
but not self, and the strength of this encoding predicted individual differences in moral behavior. 
LPFC was most active on trials where inflicting pain yielded minimal profit, the very same trials 
considered most blameworthy by a second group of participants who provided blame judgments 
of decisions to harm others for profit. A model of blame built from these judgments predicted 
LPFC activity in fMRI participants, consistent with a role for LPFC in representing moral values.  
 Previous accounts of LPFC in prosocial behavior have distinguished between inhibitory 
“braking” functions and executive “overriding” functions, generally attributed to more ventral and 
dorsal aspects of LPFC, respectively39. The region we observed here, situated in the inferior frontal 
gyrus, did not show activity consistent with inhibitory control. It was not more active during 
helpful decisions than harmful decisions, nor when helpful choices were more difficult. Instead, its 
activity pattern suggested an encoding of moral goals, which may be used to modulate action 
values represented in DS23,31. This mechanism has parallels with models of self-control in non-
social decision making, whereby long-term goals represented in LPFC modulate neural 
representations of value22,34.  
We tested this hypothesis with functional connectivity analyses and found reduced 
connectivity between LPFC and DS during the exercise of helpful choices, relative to harmful 
choices and non-social choices. The DS, in turn, showed reduced responses to profit from harming 
others to the extent that people behaved morally. The connectivity findings suggest two possible 
mechanisms that are not mutually exclusive. First, they could reflect a negative corticostriatal 
connectivity during helpful decisions, which would suggest LPFC directly down-regulates value 
representations in DS at the time of choice34. Alternatively, they could reflect a greater positive 
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connectivity during harmful decisions relative to helpful decisions, which could result from LPFC 
updating action value representations in DS following perceived moral transgressions. This latter 
account follows recent work suggesting people are uncertain about their preferences and use 
social information to “learn” what to want40. Our data are agnostic on this point as our study was 
not designed to arbitrate between these mechanisms, but future studies could usefully investigate 
possible links between moral decision making and moral learning, including the question of 
whether harm aversion declines over time41. We acknowledge that our conclusions are limited by 
the correlational nature of neuroimaging findings, and suggest future studies employ brain 
stimulation or lesion-deficit analyses to deduce the causal role of LPFC in blame computation 
beyond domain-general attentional or control functions. 
We previously reported that acutely enhancing dopamine levels with the dopamine 
precursor levodopa disrupted moral preferences16. The current findings hint at a possible 
mechanism for this effect. Moral preferences were associated with reduced DS responses to profit 
gained from harming others relative to self, and this region showed differential functional 
connectivity with the LPFC during moral decisions. Levodopa may disrupt this corticostriatal circuit 
by amplifying phasic dopamine signals in the striatum that guide action selection42,43, biasing 
choice toward immediate rewards (i.e., profits) and away from higher-order values (i.e., norm 
compliance). Such a mechanism would be consistent with reports that antisocial and aggressive 
behaviors are associated with heightened striatal dopamine44,45.  
Neural representations of others’ pain during moral decision making did not correlate with 
moral preferences in our study. Although previous work has argued such representations play a 
prominent role in mediating moral behavior10,14, these conclusions focused on neural responses to 
observing others in pain, rather than neural computations during moral decision making. As neural 
representations of others’ pain have been linked to empathy18,19, our study informs current 
debates on the extent to which empathy guides moral behavior46 and highlight the importance of 
norms in restraining self-interest. Our findings suggest that neural responses elicited by the 
potential suffering of anonymous strangers may be dissociated from the moral choices people 
make, in line with evidence that empathy and a motivation to help others are psychologically 
distinct46 and the latter (but not the former) predicts LPFC responses during costly altruism8.  
Finally, our results shed light on the question of whether moral decisions engage a 
specialized set of neural computations, or simply rely on the same circuitry that is involved in 
generic value-based decision making. Previous studies have shown that moral judgments and 
decisions engage similar neural circuitry as observed for simple value-based decisions47, but the 
encoding of subjective value for moral and non-moral decisions had never been directly compared 
in the same study. Here we found that the overall subjective value of moral choices was ultimately 
reflected in the same regions that encoded the subjective value of non-social choices. Moral 
preferences were reflected in a reduced vmPFC response to the value of harming others, which 
could reflect either a directly reduced utility for ill-gotten gains, or a partially corrupted mapping 
of utility onto vmPFC signal for ill-gotten gains. However, we also observed profit-related 
computations in the LPFC during moral decision making that were not observed during non-social 
choices of a similar nature. Responses to ill-gotten gains in LPFC correlated with moral 
preferences, and this region expressed altered functional connectivity with value-encoding regions 
during moral choices, relative to non-moral choices. Thus, the construction of moral values seems 
to incorporate additional computations that may represent anticipated or internalized moral 
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judgments of others. In this way, our conscience, the “great judge and arbiter of our conduct”2, 
may influence the values that guide the  choices we make.  
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Online Methods 
 
Participants 
Healthy volunteers were recruited from the University College London (UCL) Psychology 
department and the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience subject pools. Participants with a history 
of systemic or neurological disorders, psychiatric disorders, medication/drug use, pregnant 
women, previous participation in studies involving social interactions and/or electric shocks, or 
more than two years’ study of psychology were excluded from participation. For the fMRI study 
we recruited right-handed participants only. 
For the fMRI study, we recruited thirty-seven pairs of participants, with one participant in 
each pair completing a moral decision task in the fMRI scanner. No statistical methods were used 
to pre-determine sample sizes but our sample size was based on estimated effect size for moral 
preferences observed in two previous behavioral studies using the same task15. Two participants 
indicated they did not find the shocks aversive, three participants fell asleep in the scanner, one 
participant failed to follow task instructions, one participant expressed doubts as to whether the 
receiver would receive the shocks, and one participant requested to exit the scanner during the 
first run. A power cut resulted in data loss for another participant. These participants were 
excluded from further analysis, leaving a total of 28 participants in the role of decider whose data 
were analyzed for the fMRI study (16 males, mean age 21.9y).  
For the behavioral study, fifty-four participants participated in the role of decider. These 
participants completed the moral blame task after completing a moral decision task similar to the 
fMRI task; moral decision data from these participants has been published previously15. Five 
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participants did not provide sufficient variation in their blame judgments to allow for model fitting 
(more than 75% identical judgments or a standard deviation in judgments < 0.03); these 
participants were excluded from further analysis, leaving a total of 49 participants whose data 
were analyzed for the behavioral study (18 males, mean age 23y). 
 
 
Procedure 
Both studies took place at the Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging in London and was 
approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (4418/001). Participants completed a battery of 
online trait questionnaires approximately 1 week before attending a single testing session. Two 
individuals participated in each session. They arrived at staggered times and were led to separate 
testing rooms without seeing one another to ensure complete anonymity.  
In both studies, after providing informed consent, participants completed a pain 
thresholding procedure that has been described in detail elsewhere15. This procedure allowed us 
to (i) control for heterogeneity of skin resistance between participants, thus enabling us to deliver 
shocks of matched subjective intensity to different participants; (ii) administer a range of 
potentially painful stimuli in an ethical manner during the task itself; and (iii) provide participants 
with experience of the shocks before the decision task. Participants were then randomly assigned 
to roles of either decider or receiver using a role assignment procedure that has been described in 
detail elsewhere15.  
In the fMRI study, following role assignment the decider participant completed the moral 
decision task in the fMRI scanner. In the behavioral study, following role assignment the decider 
participant completed the moral decision task, followed by the moral blame task. Deciders were 
instructed their choices and identity would be kept confidential to minimize the extent to which 
their choices would be based on concerns about reputation or reciprocity. 
After completing the decision task, decider participants completed self-report measures 
concerning their experiences during the experiment, including a measure of how morally 
conflicted they felt about their decisions (rated on a 7-point Likert scale, 1=“not at all”, 7=“very 
much”). At the end of the session, one trial was randomly selected and actually implemented. 
Before departing the laboratory all participants completed debriefing questionnaires that assessed 
their beliefs about the experimental setup, including a measure of confidence that their choices 
and identity would remain confidential (rated from 1=“fully” to 5=“not at all”). Participants 
reported maximal confidence (decisions confidential: M=1.04, SE=0.04; identity confidential: 
M=1.04, SE=0.04). Finally, we asked participants to explain, in their own words, how they made 
their decisions during the experiment (Supplementary Table 9). No participant mentioned 
concerns about their reputation or reciprocity, while 86% of participants used language indicative 
of value computation (e.g., “worth”, “value”, “calculate”). Only 7% of participants mentioned 
concerns about the pain tolerance of the receiver.  
 
 
Moral decision task 
On each trial, deciders had to choose between two options involving pairs of numbers of 
shocks and amounts of money: a harmful option containing more shocks and money, and a helpful 
option containing fewer shocks and less money. The decider always received the money, but the 
shocks were allocated to the decider in half of the trials (self condition) and to the receiver in the 
 18 
other half (other condition). Deciders had a maximum of six seconds to select either the left or 
right side option by pressing a button box with their left or right index finger. Button presses 
resulted in the selected option being highlighted for the remainder of the six-second decision 
period. If a response was not made within six seconds, the missed trial was repeated at the end of 
the session. Transitions between conditions were cued with an instruction screen lasting two 
seconds. Each trial culminated in an inter-trial interval jittered between one and six seconds. 
Participants completed a total of 216 trials, delivered across two scanning runs lasting 
approximately twenty minutes each. To avoid habituation and preserve choice independence no 
money or shocks were delivered during the task. Instead, one trial was randomly selected and 
implemented at the end of the experiment. All procedures were fully transparent to participants, 
and no deception was used in the paradigm.  
Our trial set was optimized to jointly satisfy two constraints. First, we aimed to optimize 
the trials to give the most efficient estimates of potential participants’ harm aversion parameters 
κself and κother. Second, we aimed to de-correlate, across trials, the relative amounts of profit and 
pain that would result from participants’ choices. We satisfied the first constraint using a 
procedure described in detail elsewhere15 to create a set of 54 trials that efficiently estimated 
participants’ harm aversion parameters. We then repeated this procedure 10,000 times. For each 
iteration we simulated choices on the trial set across a range of values of κself and κother, computed 
the correlations between the amounts of profit and pain resulting from simulated choices, and 
selected the trial set that resulted in the lowest correlation between parameters. After creating 
this optimized trial set, we duplicated it and reversed the left and right options, producing a full 
set of 108 trials. Participants completed each of these 108 trials in both the self condition and the 
other condition, for a total of 216 trials. Thus, each money/shock pair appeared four times: twice 
in each condition (self/other) and twice on each side (left/right). We created four different trial 
sequences that each contained an equal number of self- and other-trials in the first and second 
blocks of 108 trials, and participants were randomly assigned to receive one of the four trial 
sequences. 
 The trial optimization procedure successfully satisfied our constraints: across trials, the 
amounts of profit and pain that would result from choosing the more harmful option were 
uncorrelated (r=0.009, p=0.926; Fig. 1b). In addition, there were no significant correlations 
between the relative and total number of shocks across the two options (r=-0.02, p=0.84), nor 
between the relative and total amounts of money across the two options (r=-0.13, p=0.18). Across 
participants, relative and total subjective values were also not significantly correlated (r=-0.14, 
p=0.15). This suggests our findings related to relative values are unlikely to be explained by overall 
value. 
 
 
Moral blame task 
 Participants evaluated sequences of 30 moral decisions made by two fictional agents, 
presented in random order, for a total of 60 trials. Trials were self-paced. On each trial, agents 
faced a choice similar to that faced by deciders in the fMRI study, i.e., they had to choose between 
delivering more painful electric shocks to another person for a larger profit, and delivering fewer 
shocks but for a smaller profit. We used our model of moral decision making15 to simulate the 
choices of a bad agent with κother=0.3 who mostly chose the harmful option, and a good agent with 
κother=0.7 who mostly chose the helpful option. After observing each choice, participants provided 
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a moral judgment of the choice on a continuous visual analogue scale ranging from 0 
(blameworthy) to 1 (praiseworthy) (Supplementary Fig. 1). Across trials, we independently 
manipulated the amounts of profit and pain resulting from the agent’s choices, which enabled us 
to examine how profit and pain resulting from harmful choices load onto blame judgments.  
 
 
fMRI acquisition and preprocessing 
fMRI scanning was performed on a 3-Tesla Siemens Allegra scanner with a Siemens head 
coil at the Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging at University College London. Functional 
images were taken with a gradient echo T2*-weighted echo-planar sequence (repetition 
time=2.40 s, echo time=30 ms, flip angle=90o, 64x64 matrix, field of view=192 mm, slice 
thickness=2 mm with 1 mm gap). A total of 40 axial slices were acquired in ascending order (in-
plane resolution 3x3 mm). 428 volumes were acquired in each of two sessions and the initial five 
volumes of each session were discarded to allow for steady-state magnetization. Slices were tilted 
at an orientation of -30 degrees to minimize signal dropout in ventral frontal cortex. Anatomical 
images were T1-weighted (MDEFT, 1x1x1 mm resolution). We also acquired a field map (double-
echo FLASH, short TE=10 ms, long TE=12.46 ms, 3x3x3 mm resolution with 1 mm gap) for 
distortion correction of functional images. We used a breathing belt and pulse oximeter for 
collecting physiological data during the imaging sessions.  
All image preprocessing and analysis was carried out in SPM8 (Wellcome Department of 
Imaging Neuroscience). Images were realigned to the first scan of the first session and unwarped 
using field maps, spatially normalized via segmentation of the T1 structural image into gray 
matter, white matter, and CSF using ICBM tissue probability maps, and spatially smoothed with a 
Gaussian kernel (8 mm, full-width at half-maximum).  
 
 
GLM1: model of relative chosen value 
We constructed a GLM to identify regions responding parametrically at decision onset to 
the subjective value of the chosen and unchosen options, as determined by our computational 
model of choice. We regressed fMRI time series onto a GLM containing four main event regressors 
describing the onsets of (i) self trials where the left option was selected; (ii) self trials where the 
right option was selected; (iii) other trials where the left option was selected; and (iv) other trials 
where the right option was selected. All four events were modeled with a duration corresponding 
to the participant’s RT on that trial and were each associated with two parametric modulators: the 
subjective value of the chosen and unchosen options, derived from each participant’s choice 
model. Critically, custom scripts ensured that these four parametric modulators competed for 
variance during the estimation, rather than being serially orthogonalized as is standard in SPM. 
The GLM contained four additional event regressors of no interest, describing the onsets of: (i) left 
button presses; (ii) right button presses; (iii) screen signaling transition to self condition; and (iv) 
screen signaling transition to other condition. These events were modeled as stick functions with 
duration zero. Finally, a total of 23 nuisance regressors were included to control for motion and 
physiological effects of no interest. These included the six motion regressors obtained during 
realignment, as well as 17 physiological regressors derived from a physiological noise model, 
constructed using an in-house Matlab toolbox48: ten for cardiac phase, six for respiratory phase, 
and one for respiratory volume. 
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GLM2: model of decision parameters 
We built a general linear model (GLM) to identify regions responding parametrically at 
decision onset, irrespective of participants’ choices, to the objective amounts of profit and pain 
that would result from choosing the harmful option, relative to the helpful option, in the self and 
other conditions. We regressed fMRI time series onto a GLM containing four main event 
regressors describing the onsets of (i) self trials where the left option was selected; (ii) self trials 
where the right option was selected; (iii) other trials where the left option was selected; and (iv) 
other trials where the right option was selected. All four events were modeled with a duration 
corresponding to the participant’s RT on that trial and were each associated with four parametric 
modulators: the amount of profit and pain for the harmful and the helpful option, irrespective of 
what the participant chose. Again we ensured that these two parametric modulators competed for 
variance during the estimation. There were four additional event regressors of no interest, 
indicating the onsets of button presses and transitions between task conditions, and 23 nuisance 
regressors controlling for motion and physiological effects of no interest. 
 
 
GLM3-6: ROI analysis in LPFC 
To test different accounts of the role of LPFC in moral decision making, we extracted time 
course data from a 4mm sphere surrounding independently defined ROI coordinates in LPFC. 
Because we were interested in moral decisions we restricted these analyses to trials in the other 
condition. Custom MATLAB scripts were used to orthogonalize each participant’s time series with 
respect to motion & physiological regressors and apply a high-pass filter. The time series were 
then normalized, up-sampled at 100 ms, and time-locked to decision onsets, creating a data matrix 
with dimensions nTrials x nTimepoints. Next we fit a GLM across trials separately for each 
participant, resulting in parameter estimates at each time point for each GLM regressor. To test 
the significance of each regressor in LPFC, we convolved the regressor time series with a canonical 
hemodynamic response function aligned to decision onset and calculated resulting t statistics and 
p values. The latency for the canonical hemodynamic response function was estimated using the 
CANlab Core Tools package49. 
We tested 4 GLMs in LPFC using the above procedure. GLM3: y=B1*vdiff + B2*vtot + 
B3*blame + e; GLM4: y=B1*vdiff + B2*mtot + B3*stot + B4*blame + e; GLM5: y=B1*help + B2*vdiff + 
B3*vtot + B4*blame + e; and GLM6: y=B1*vhelp + B2*vharm + B3*vhelp*help + B4*vharm*help + B5*vdiff + 
e; vdiff refers to relative chosen value(i.e., the value of the chosen option relative to the unchosen 
option), vtot refers to sum of the values of the chosen and unchosen options, mtot refers to the 
total amount of money available on a trial, stot refers to the total number of shocks available on a 
trial, vharm refers to the value of the harmful option, vhelp refers to the value of the helpful option, 
and e denotes an error term. Value regressors and the blame regressor were computed 
individually for each participant based on their individual preference parameters estimated from 
the moral decision model. 
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PPI model: functional connectivity with LPFC 
We created LPFC seed regressors by computing individual average time series within 4mm 
spheres surrounding individual subject peaks within the functional masks of left LPFC as shown in 
Fig. 2A. The locations of the peak voxels were based on the GLM2 contrast showing parametric 
effects of profit resulting from choosing the more harmful option in the other condition, relative to 
the self condition. Variance associated with the six motion regressors was removed from the 
extracted time series. To construct a time series of neural activity in the left LPFC, the seed time 
courses were de-convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function. We then 
estimated the first PPI model (PPI1) with the following regressors: (1) an interaction between the 
neural activity in LPFC and a vector coding for the main effect of decision type (1 for help other, -1 
for harm other); (2) the main effect of decision type; and (3) the original BOLD eigenvariate (i.e., 
the average time series from the LPFC seed), as well as the six motion parameters as regressors of 
no interest. We also estimated a second, complementary PPI model (PPI2) that was identical to 
the first model, except the first regressor contrasted decisions to help other with decisions to help 
self (1 for help other, -1 for help self).  
 
 
Statistical analyses 
We used a within-subjects design, so experimental group randomization and blinding were not 
applicable. Data analysis was not performed blind to the conditions of the experiments. We 
analyzed behavioral data using t tests and multiple linear regression. We analyzed fMRI data using 
mass univariate methods implemented in SPM8. At the first level we implemented linear 
regression at each voxel, using generalized least squares with a global approximate AR(1) 
autocorrelation model, drift fit with Discrete Cosine Transform basis (128s cutoff). At the second 
level we implemented linear regression at each voxel, using ordinary least squares. All Student’s t 
tests were two-tailed. For correlations between brain responses and moral preferences we report 
the percentage bend correlation, which is robust to outliers, using the Matlab robust correlation 
toolbox50. The toolbox uses the 95% bootstrap confidence interval rather than p-values to make 
statistical inferences, because the 95% confidence interval is less affected by heteroscedasticity 
than the traditional t-test. 
 
Moral decision task: choices. We analyzed the moral decision data with a model based on 
previous studies using the moral decision task15,16 that explained choices in terms of the value 
difference (ΔV) between the harmful and helpful options. As the fMRI task required participants to 
select between two alternatives on each trial, rather than switch from a default to an alternative 
option as in previous studies, we omitted the loss aversion parameter from the model here. Trial-
by-trial value differences were transformed into choice probabilities using a softmax function35:  
𝑃(𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒) =  (
1
1 + 𝑒−𝛾Δ𝑉
) 
where γ is a subject-specific inverse temperature parameter that characterizes the sensitivity of 
choices to ΔV. We optimized participant-specific parameters across trials using nonlinear 
optimization implemented in MATLAB (MathWorks) for maximum likelihood estimation. 
Parameters were estimated individually for each participant, and summary statistics were 
calculated from these parameter estimates at the group level, treating each parameter estimate as 
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a random effect51. Parametric statistics were used to compare harm aversion for self and others as 
these parameters were normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic for κother=0.097, 
p=0.2; for κself=0.107, p=0.2). See Supplementary Modeling Note and Supplementary Software for 
details. 
 
 Moral decision task: RTs. We analyzed RT data using a GLM (RT-GLM1) that regressed RTs 
during the other condition against the following regressors: (1) dummy indicating helpful vs. 
harmful choices; (2) unsigned value difference; (3) total value; and (4) maximum number of 
shocks. In a second GLM (RT-GLM2) we regressed RTs during all conditions against the following 
regressors: (1) dummy indicating self vs. other condition; (2) unsigned value difference; (3) total 
value; and (4) maximum number of shocks. We optimized participant-specific parameters across 
trials using the glmfit procedure in Matlab. Parameters were estimated individually for each 
participant, and summary statistics were calculated from these parameter estimates at the group 
level, treating each parameter estimate as a random effect51. See Supplementary Table 7 and 
Supplementary Software for details. 
 
Moral blame task. We analyzed the moral blame data using a GLM that regressed 
participants’ z-scored blame judgments onto the amounts of profit and pain resulting from 
harmful decisions (relative to helpful decisions) as well as individual preference parameters (κself, 
κother) estimated from the moral decision model. We also estimated a second, reduced model that 
included terms for profit and pain only. Because we were primarily interested in blame judgments 
for harmful choices, we restricted this analysis to trials on which the bad agent chose the harmful 
option. Group level parameters were estimated using the regress function in MATLAB. We report F 
statistics and p values from the full models as well as parameter estimates and 95% confidence 
intervals for each model in the Supplementary Modeling Note. We used the blame model, 
estimated on data from the behavioral study, to create a unique blame regressor for each 
participant in the fMRI study (Fig. 3a). These were computed by applying the parameters from the 
blame model to the amounts of profit and pain in the fMRI trials, and the fMRI participants’ 
preferences parameters κself & κother. The blame regressors were used in GLM3-5. See 
Supplementary Modeling Note and Supplementary Software for details. 
 
fMRI: Correction for multiple comparisons. For whole brain analyses, we tested for 
statistical significance using whole brain correction (p<0.05, FWE corrected at the cluster level 
after voxel-wise thresholding at p<0.001). This threshold provides an acceptable FWE control52. 
Post hoc analyses of regions identified in the whole brain analyses were carried out using one-
sample t-tests on mean signal extracted from 4mm spheres surrounding independently defined 
ROIs (Supplementary Table 2). For ROI analyses, mean signal was extracted from 4mm spheres 
surrounding coordinates defined from previous studies.  For analyses in TPJ, ACC and insula, we 
took coordinates from previous meta-analyses of empathy for pain and moral judgment19,53. For 
analyses in LPFC we took the mean of peak coordinates from previous studies investigating LPFC 
modulation of subjective value signals54–58. For analyses in DS we took coordinates from 
anatomical study of corticostriatal connectivity33. Images are displayed at a threshold of p<0.005, 
k>10 to show the extent of activation in significant clusters. Results are reported using the MNI 
coordinate system. 
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fMRI: PPI analysis. For the LPFC connectivity analysis we tested for statistical significance 
by conducting a conjunction analysis of the PPI contrasts from PPI1 & PPI2. To compute an 
appropriate threshold for the two-way conjunction of contrasts, we employed Fisher’s method59, a 
procedure that combines probabilities of multiple hypothesis tests using the following formula: 
𝜒2 = −2 ∑ log𝑒(𝑝𝑖)
𝑘
𝑖=1
 
where pi corresponds to the p-value for the ith test being combined, k corresponds to the number 
of tests to be combined, and the resulting statistic has a 𝜒2 distribution with 2k degrees of 
freedom. According to this method, thresholding each contrast at p=0.01 resulted in a combined 
threshold of p<0.001, uncorrected. We report as significant results surviving whole brain 
correction for multiple comparisons (cluster-level corrected after voxel-wise thresholding at 
p<0.001). 
 
 
Data availability 
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon 
reasonable request.  
 
 
Code availability 
Analysis code for fitting models to moral decision choice data, moral decision RT data and blame 
judgment data are provided as Supplementary Software. All other analysis code is available from 
the corresponding author upon reasonable request. 
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